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ABSTRACT
We show that the incentives a vertically integrated supplier may have to disadvantage or
“sabotage” the activities of downstream rivals vary with both the type of sabotage and the nature
of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage is typically profitable under both Cournot and
Bertrand competition. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage is often profitable under Cournot
competition, but unprofitable under Bertrand competition. Incentives for sabotage can vary non-
monotonically with the degree of product differentiation.
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1. In December 1999, Verizon became the first RBOC to secure permission to provide in-region long
distance (i.e., interLATA) service (in New York State). SBC followed suit (in Texas) in June 2000. As
of January 1, 2003, the RBOCs had received permission to provide in-region interLATA service in
thirty-five states.  (http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications.)
2. Similar concerns led to the divestiture of the Bell System in 1984. See, for example, Faulhaber (1987,
p. 84).
1.    Introduction.
In many important industries, regulated suppliers of essential upstream products are capable of
operating in unregulated downstream markets. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) supply access to the local telecommunications
network, and they could deliver long distance telephone service if they were permitted to do so.
Until recently, though, regulators have forbidden the RBOCs from providing long distance telephone
service.1 A primary rationale for this prohibition is that it prevents the RBOCs from engaging in
activities that unduly favor their long distance affiliates at the expense of their downstream rivals.
Such activities include: (1) providing inferior service to competitors, perhaps in part by increasing
the relative frequency with which their calls are blocked (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.10); (2)
delaying competitors’ attempts to implement new and improved services (Economides, 1998; Kang
and Weisman, 2001); (3) withholding crucial information from competitors about how they might
best utilize the network to provide valued services to their customers (Bernheim and Willig, 1996,
p. 4.10; Economides, 1998); and (4) structuring services and standards to favor the operations of
their downstream affiliates at the expense of rivals (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.6; Beard et al.,
2001).2
The economic literature refers to activities of this sort that disadvantage downstream rivals as
sabotage, and typically assumes that sabotage serves to raise the operating costs of downstream
rivals. The literature concludes that by raising the costs of downstream rivals, sabotage generally
increases the profit of the downstream affiliate of the vertically integrated producer. This is the case
3. Kang and Weisman (2001) examine both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Mandy (2000) provides
a review of the literature.
4. See Mandy (2000), Kang and Weisman (2001), Weisman and Williams (2001), and Kondaurova and
Weisman (2003) for examples of such industry-specific investigations. This countervailing upstream
effect of downstream sabotage is one key difference between this literature and the earlier literature on
raising rivals’ costs (e.g., Salop and Scheffman, 1983, 1987).
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whether downstream suppliers engage in Cournot (quantity-setting) competition (e.g., Economides,
1998; Sibley and Weisman, 1998b; Bustos and Galetovic, 2003) or Bertrand (price-setting)
competition (e.g., Weisman, 1995; Beard et al., 2001; Kondaurova and Weisman, 2003).3 The
literature also notes, though, that by inducing downstream rivals to reduce their output, cost-
increasing sabotage can decrease demand for the upstream product (e.g., access to the
telecommunications network), and thereby reduce upstream profit when the price of the upstream
product exceeds its marginal cost of production (Weisman, 1995; Sibley and Weisman, 1998, 1999;
Kang and Weisman, 2001). Thus, the literature suggests that because cost-increasing sabotage
generally increases the downstream profit and reduces the upstream returns of the vertically
integrated supplier, the likelihood of sabotage in practice is an empirical matter that merits
investigation on an industry-by-industry basis.4
The primary purpose of our research is to demonstrate that these qualitative conclusions do not
necessarily hold when sabotage serves to reduce rivals’ demands rather than raise rivals’ costs.
Although some forms of sabotage (e.g., engaging in protracted litigation and imposing standards that
are particularly costly for rival producers to adopt) may increase rivals’ operating costs, other forms
of sabotage (e.g., degrading the relative quality of competitors’ products and limiting the ability of
competitors to test new products and deliver them to customers) may primarily reduce the demand
for rivals’ products. We show that in plausible settings, a vertically integrated supplier will choose
not to undertake demand-reducing sabotage, even though it will implement cost-increasing sabotage.
Another purpose of this research is to show that the potential gains from sabotage vary not only
5. In this regard, our findings are consistent with those of  et al. (2000). The authors analyze a
model in which Internet backbone providers choose their capacity levels and the quality of their
interconnection with other backbone providers. The authors demonstrate that large providers typically
prefer to implement lower interconnection qualities because doing so reduces differentially the value
of the services that smaller rivals can deliver to their customers.
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with the type of sabotage, but also with the nature of downstream competition. We show that
demand-reducing sabotage typically functions much like cost-increasing sabotage under downstream
Cournot competition.5 In this setting, both demand-reducing and cost-increasing sabotage induce
rivals to reduce their output levels. Reduced rival output increases the demand for the downstream
product of the vertically integrated supplier, and thereby increases its downstream profit. Aggregate
downstream output can fall, however, and thereby reduce the demand for upstream access, and
hence, upstream profit. Consequently, the vertically-integrated supplier must weigh these
countervailing effects when determining its preferred level of demand-reducing sabotage under
downstream Cournot competition. The downstream price increases induced by cost-increasing
sabotage under Bertrand competition give rise to similar countervailing effects.
In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage can give rise to very different effects under Bertrand
competition. By reducing the demand for rivals’ products, the sabotage induces rival downstream
firms to reduce the prices they charge for their products. That is, rivals respond aggressively under
Bertrand competition, in contrast to their accommodating behavior under Cournot competition. The
rivals’ price reductions under Bertrand competition, in turn, reduce the demand for the downstream
product of the integrated supplier, and thereby reduce its downstream profit. And unless the quantity
responses to the induced downstream price reductions more than offset the direct reduction in
downstream output caused by sabotage, demand for the upstream product also declines, which
typically reduces upstream profit. Consequently, the integrated supplier usually refrains from
demand-reducing sabotage in the presence of downstream Bertrand competition.
The formal derivation of our findings begins in section 2, where we examine the integrated
6. As products become more homogeneous, the downstream division of the integrated firm is able to satisfy
more of the customer demand that is displaced by cost-increasing or demand-reducing sabotage. This
effect ensures that sabotage provides larger downstream gains and smaller upstream losses for the
integrated firm under some conditions, and so will be pursued more vigorously.
7. Although our formal analysis considers the setting where a regulator sets the price charged by a
monopoly upstream producer, our basic qualitative conclusions have broader relevance. As Economides
(1998), Mandy (2000), and others point out, concerns about potential sabotage arise in many industries,
including the computer software industry.
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supplier’s incentives for sabotage when downstream producers engage in Cournot competition. The
corresponding incentives for sabotage when downstream firms engage in Bertrand competition are
analyzed in section 3. In section 4, linear versions of the models are analyzed to determine how
incentives for sabotage vary with the degree of product differentiation. We identify plausible
conditions under which the incentives for sabotage increase systematically as products become more
homogeneous.6 However, we also demonstrate that sabotage does not always vary monotonically
with the degree of product homogeneity.
This research concludes in section 5, where we discuss the implications of our findings and
directions for future research. We emphasize that our finding that demand-reducing sabotage is often
unprofitable does not imply that the potential for sabotage should be ignored when designing public
policy toward vertical integration in regulated industries.7 Instead, our findings help to identify the
types of sabotage that may be most problematic in practice and the industry conditions under which
the incentives for sabotage are likely to be most pronounced.
2.    Cournot Competition.
First consider the setting in which the downstream firms engage in Cournot (quantity-setting)
competition. For simplicity, we analyze duopoly competition between the downstream affiliate of
the integrated producer and an unaffiliated rival. The rival’s fixed cost of production is denoted
 and its constant marginal cost of production (absent any cost-increasing sabotage and
8. We follow both the literature and common practice by examining uniform, non-discriminatory access
prices. We assume the access price exceeds the upstream marginal cost of production for expositional
convenience. The qualitative changes that would arise if access were priced below cost will become
apparent as we proceed. Notice in particular that upstream profit increases as the demand for access
declines when . By focusing on the setting where   we avoid this (obvious and largely
uninteresting) reason for sabotaging rivals’ operations.
9. Section 271(d)(6) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.)) empowers the Federal Communications Commission to penalize a
Bell operating company that is found to have discriminated against a competing supplier of interLATA
services. Possible penalties include a monetary fine and suspension or revocation of the Bell operating
company’s right to provide interLATA services.
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abstracting from the cost of the upstream input) is denoted . The corresponding fixed and
marginal costs of the downstream affiliate of the integrated firm (hereafter the affiliate) are denoted
 0 and  0,  respectively. All fixed costs are assumed to be sunk costs.
One unit of the upstream product (e.g., access to the local telephone network) is required for
each unit of the downstream product (e.g., long distance telephone calls) that is produced. The
upstream product, called access, is produced by the upstream division of the integrated firm at
constant marginal cost , after fixed cost  is incurred. The upstream producer
supplies all of the access that is demanded by the downstream producers at the regulated access price
8 
In addition to supplying access, the upstream firm may undertake cost-increasing sabotage
 demand-reducing sabotage ( ), or both. Each unit of cost-increasing sabotage increases the
rival’s marginal cost by one unit. Demand-reducing sabotage systematically reduces the demand for
the rival’s product in the manner described below.  denotes the direct cost incurred by the
upstream producer when it undertakes  units of cost-increasing sabotage and  units of
demand-reducing sabotage. In practice, the direct costs of sabotage might include extra litigation
or engineering expenses, or penalties that are incurred if sabotage is detected by regulators, for
example.9 The costs of sabotage are assumed to be non-negative and to increase with the level of
10. As Reiffen (1998) points out, higher levels of sabotage could reduce upstream operating costs. When
this is the case, sabotage will offer benefits to the upstream firm in addition to those that we identify
below. We abstract from these considerations for expositional simplicity, although we will often
consider the benchmark setting where sabotage is not costly (so  = 0 for all ).
11. Here and throughout the ensuing discussion, stated inequalities are assumed to hold for all values of the
relevant variables, unless otherwise noted.
12. To ensure compact strategy spaces, we presume that  at some finite  > 0 and
 at some finite  > 0.
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sabotage at a non-decreasing rate (i.e.,   and  for  = ,
where the subscript i (here and throughout) denotes the partial derivative with respect to the ith
argument of the function.10,11
 denotes the maximum price the affiliate can charge and still sell  units of output
when the rival sells   units of output.   denotes the corresponding maximum price
the rival can charge and still sell  units of output when the affiliate sells  units of output and
the upstream firm has undertaken  units of demand-reducing sabotage. The maximum price that
each firm can charge for its product is a decreasing function of its own output (so  when
 and , for  Furthermore, the products of the two downstream operators
are gross substitutes, so  for   In addition, demand-reducing sabotage reduces
the maximum price the rival can set for all output levels (i.e., ).12 
When the affiliate and the rival sell  and  units of output, respectively, and when the
upstream producer undertakes and  units of cost-increasing and demand-reducing sabotage,
respectively, upstream profit, , is:
(2.1)
The corresponding downstream profit of the affiliate,  is:
 (2.2)
and the corresponding profit of the rival, ,  is:
13. In practice, vertically integrated producers are sometimes required to conduct their downstream
operations through a separate subsidiary. A separate subsidiary may value its own profit more highly
than it values the profit of the integrated firm. Our main qualitative conclusions are readily shown to
persist in such a setting. We provide further thoughts on this issue in the concluding section.
14. See Bulow et al. (1985). A sufficient condition for quantities to be strategic substitutes in the present
setting is that  0  for   = , , so that the inverse demand curve facing each firm becomes
steeper as its opponent’s output increases.
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 (2.3)
 denotes the total profit of the integrated firm.
We focus on the case in which the upstream and downstream divisions of the integrated firm
seek to maximize the firm’s total profit.13 In this case, after the upstream firm observes the regulated
access price, it implements the amount of sabotage that maximizes , anticipating the
downstream activity to follow. After observing the access price and the established levels of
sabotage, the downstream producers select their output levels noncooperatively and simultaneously.
The affiliate chooses  to maximize  and the rival chooses  to maximize  The
chosen quantity levels constitute a Nash equilibrium. After the quantities are set, market-clearing
prices are established, outputs are sold, and profits are realized. This interaction is not repeated.
We adopt the standard assumption that downstream quantities are strategic substitutes (so
 for .14  This assumption ensures that an increase in the output of one firm
reduces the marginal return from increased output to the other firm or, equivalently, increases the
marginal return from decreased output to the other firm. Consequently, the subgame in which the
affiliate chooses  and the rival chooses  is supermodular (Topkis, 1995; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1990; Vives, 1999, pp. 32-34). Therefore, if increases in sabotage systematically reduce
the rival’s incremental return from expanded output (i.e., if  and
 for all ), higher levels of sabotage will reduce the rival’s equilibrium
15. The effects of sabotage on the incremental return of the integrated firm need not be considered because
neither sabotage parameter enters . The same is not true in the Bertrand analysis of section 3.
16. It follows from Vives (1999, pp. 33-34) that an equilibrium exists in the setting under consideration. If
the equilibrium is not unique, the conclusions in Lemma 2.1 (and all ensuing formal conclusions) pertain
to the extremal equilibria (Vives, 1999, pp. 34-35).
17. It can be shown that the equilibrium in the Cournot subgame will be unique under the maintained
assumptions if, in addition, the inverse demand curves are concave in own quantities, equal increases
in both downstream outputs render each competitor’s price more sensitive to its own output, and own-
price effects outweigh cross-price effects (i.e., if , , and 
for ). When the Cournot equilibrium is unique and interior: (i) the equilibrium output of the
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output and increase the affiliate’s equilibrium output (Vives, 1999, p. 35).15
Higher levels of cost-increasing sabotage always reduce the rival’s return from expanded output
by increasing the rival’s marginal cost of production ( ). Increased demand-reducing
sabotage will also reduce the rival’s return from expanded output if the increased sabotage does not
decrease the sensitivity of the rival’s price to its output. Formally, assumption (A2.1) is sufficient
to ensure .
Assumption (A2.1).     0 .
When assumption (A2.1) holds, demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival’s inverse demand curve
inward and makes it steeper. Both effects render a lower output optimal for the rival. 
The effects of increased sabotage on equilibrium output levels are summarized in Lemma 2.1.16
Lemma 2.1.    Under downstream Cournot competition:
(i) the affiliate’s equilibrium output is non-decreasing and the rival’s equilibrium output in non-
increasing in the level of cost-increasing sabotage; and 
(ii) the affiliate’s equilibrium output is non-decreasing and the rival’s equilibrium output is non-
increasing in the level of demand-reducing sabotage if assumption (A2.1) holds. More
generally, the effects of increased demand-reducing sabotage on downstream quantities are
ambiguous.17 
affiliate  strictly increases and the rival’s equilibrium output strictly decreases as cost-increasing
sabotage increases; and (ii) the affiliate’s equilibrium output strictly increases and the rival’s equilibrium
output strictly decreases as demand-reducing sabotage increases if assumption (A2.1) holds. These
conclusions can be proved using conventional comparative static analysis (Mandy and Sappington,
2001).
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Lemma 2.1 reports an unambiguous impact of cost-increasing sabotage on downstream outputs.
By raising the rival’s operating costs, cost-increasing sabotage induces the rival to reduce its output.
The reduction in the rival’s output shifts outward the affiliate’s demand curve. In response, the
affiliate increases its output.
In contrast, the impact of demand-reducing sabotage is ambiguous in general. Because it shifts
the rival’s inverse demand curve inward, one effect of demand-reducing sabotage is to encourage
the rival to reduce its output. A countervailing effect is also possible, though. If demand-reducing
sabotage renders the rival’s inverse demand curve less steep, so that a smaller price reduction is
required to sell any given increase in output, the rival may prefer to expand its output. However, if
demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival’s inverse demand curve inward and makes it more steep
(as when assumption (A2.1) holds), demand-reducing sabotage will induce the rival to reduce its
output by unambiguously reducing the marginal value of increased output to the rival. This reduction
in the rival’s output shifts the affiliate’s demand curve outward. In response to the increase in the
demand for its product, the affiliate increases its output.
When sabotage induces the rival to reduce its output, the resulting increase in demand for the
affiliate’s product ensures higher downstream profit for the affiliate in standard fashion (e.g., Dixit,
1986; Vives, 1999, p. 102). Therefore, absent upstream effects, cost-increasing sabotage always
increases the profit of the integrated firm, as does demand-reducing sabotage that does not decrease
the sensitivity of the rival’s price to its output. These conclusions are recorded formally as
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2. Upstream effects are said to be absent when the upstream profit margin is
zero (so  and sabotage is not costly (so  for all 
18. This conclusion reflects the insights of Weisman (1995) and Sibley and Weisman (1998, 1999), for
example.
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Proposition 2.1.  When upstream effects are absent and the downstream competitors engage in
Cournot competition, the upstream producer will undertake cost-increasing sabotage.
Proposition 2.2.  When upstream effects are absent, assumption (A2.1) holds, and the downstream
competitors engage in Cournot competition, the upstream producer will undertake demand-
reducing sabotage.
Upstream effects need not be entirely absent to ensure that sabotage will arise in equilibrium.
As long as the direct costs of initial increments in sabotage (  and  and the
upstream profit margin  are sufficiently small, the increase in the affiliate’s downstream
profit that sabotage engenders will outweigh any countervailing decrease in upstream profit.
However, since sabotage can reduce the rival’s downstream output, it can thereby reduce the rival’s
demand for access. Consequently, if the upstream profit margin is sufficiently large, sabotage can
reduce the upstream profit more than it increases the downstream profit of the integrated firm. If it
does so, sabotage will not arise in equilibrium.18 
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 suggest that, at least under the identified conditions, demand-reducing
sabotage acts very much like cost-increasing sabotage. Both increase the downstream profit but may
decrease the upstream profit of the integrated firm. As the analysis in section 3 reveals, this
conclusion is sensitive to the type of competition that prevails downstream.
3.    Bertrand Competition.
Now consider a setting that is analogous to the setting analyzed in section 2 except that the
downstream firms engage in Bertrand (price-setting) competition rather than Cournot (quantity-
setting) competition. The notation employed to analyze this setting is identical to the notation
19. We assume the existence of prices ( ) above marginal costs such that  and
. This assumption ensures that the strategy spaces  
and   are compact. Notice that all values of  below marginal cost can
be eliminated from  without loss of generality because such values are not optimal. In contrast,
although values of  below the rival’s marginal cost, , are not optimal,  generally
cannot be included as part of the lower bound on when citing standard theorems about supermodular
games. Such inclusion would render the strategy space dependent on the comparative static parameter
.
20. Since , a sufficient condition for  for
all  is that the inverse demand curve facing each downstream competitor
becomes steeper as its opponent’s price increases (i.e., for ). This condition is not
sufficient to ensure  for all  because  may be below .
must exceed  everywhere on  to ensure that  globally.
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developed above except that the demand curves facing the affiliate and the rival are denoted
 and , respectively, where  denotes the price set by downstream
competitor   
The products sold by the two downstream competitors continue to be gross substitutes (so
 for  =  in this Bertrand setting. Furthermore, the maximum amount that each
downstream firm can sell declines as its price increases (so  for  ). In addition,
demand-reducing sabotage continues to reduce demand for the rival’s product (so . 
In this Bertrand setting, for given prices and sabotage levels, the profit of the upstream and
downstream divisions of the integrated firm and the rival are, respectively:
     ;  (3.1)
      ;  and (3.2)
      (3.3)
 again denotes the total profit of the integrated firm.19
We adopt the standard assumption that downstream prices are strategic complements (i.e.,
 for ).20 This assumption ensures that an increase in one firm’s price increases
21. See  Vives (1999,  p. 151) and the references cited in section 2.
22. This potential countervailing effect is analogous to the potential countervailing effect of demand-
reducing sabotage under Cournot competition, but it works in the opposite direction. Under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition, the effect of demand-reducing sabotage will be unambiguous only
if it affects the slope of the rival’s inverse demand so as to reinforce the inward shift of the inverse
demand. The reinforcement arises under Cournot competition when the inverse demand becomes
steeper, which renders a quantity reduction more profitable for the rival. The reinforcement arises under
Bertrand competition when the inverse demand curve becomes less steep, which renders a price decrease
more profitable for the rival.
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the marginal return to the other firm from an increase in its price. Consequently, the Bertrand
subgame is supermodular.21 Therefore, if increases in sabotage systematically increase (respectively,
reduce) both firms’ incremental returns from raising their prices, higher levels of sabotage will
increase (respectively, reduce) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival (Vives, 1999,
p. 35).
Higher levels of cost-increasing sabotage always increase the rival’s incremental return from
raising its price (i.e.,  =  > 0). This is because, by raising its
price, the rival reduces the number of units of output on which it incurs the higher marginal cost
caused by the increased cost-increasing sabotage. Moreover, cost-increasing sabotage does not affect
the affiliate’s incremental return from raising its price (i.e., ). Therefore,
as reported in Lemma 3.1 below, cost-increasing sabotage will never cause downstream prices to
decline.
The effects of demand-reducing sabotage are more complicated under Bertrand competition,
as they are under Cournot competition. Demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival’s inverse demand
curve inward, which encourages the rival to reduce its price. However, two countervailing effects
could arise. First, if demand-reducing sabotage were to reduce the sensitivity of the rival’s demand
to its price, the rival could increase its price without suffering as great a reduction in quantity
demanded. Consequently, the rival might prefer to set a higher price.22 Second, if demand-reducing
23. No analogue to this second potential countervailing effect arises under Cournot competition. This is
because the Cournot affiliate conjectures that the rival’s quantity is fixed (i.e., unresponsive to demand-
reducing sabotage), and it is the rival’s quantity, not its price, that directly enters the affiliate’s objective.
The Cournot affiliate thus anticipates no effect on upstream profit from an increase in demand-reducing
sabotage.
24. When analyzing changes in  we can, without loss of generality, consider a modified version of the
game in which the strategy space of the rival is  . In this modified game,
 for   is sufficient for strategic complementarity,  is sufficient for
, and  is sufficient for .
25. It follows from Vives (1999, pp. 33-34) that an equilibrium exists in the setting under consideration. If
the equilibrium is not unique, the conclusions in Lemma 3.1 (and all ensuing formal conclusions) pertain
to the extremal equilibria (Vives, 1999, pp. 34-45).
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sabotage were to render the rival’s demand more responsive to increases in the affiliate’s price, the
affiliate might prefer to increase its price. The higher price could conceivably induce a sufficiently
large increase in the rival’s output, and thus its demand for access, as to increase upstream profit.23
Assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2) are sufficient to preclude these two countervailing effects.
Assumption (A3.1) ensures  that demand-reducing sabotage makes the rival’s demand more
sensitive to increases in the rival’s price. Assumption (A3.2) ensures that when upstream effects are
relevant (in particular, when ), increases in demand-reducing sabotage render the rival’s
demand less sensitive to increases in the affiliate’s price.
Assumption (A3.1).     .
Assumption (A3.2).      .
Consequently, when assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2) hold, higher levels of demand-reducing
sabotage reduce the marginal profitability of price increases for both the rival and the affiliate (i.e.,
 and ).24 Therefore, Lemma 3.1 follows.25
Lemma 3.1.    Under downstream Bertrand competition:
26. It can be shown that the equilibrium in the Bertrand subgame is unique under the maintained
assumptions if, in addition, assumption (A3.4) (stated below) holds. When the Bertrand equilibrium is
unique and interior: (i) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival strictly increase as cost-
increasing sabotage increases; and (ii) the equilibrium prices of both the affiliate and the rival strictly
decrease as demand-reducing sabotage increases if assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2) hold. These
conclusions can be proved using conventional comparative static analysis (Mandy and Sappington,
2001).
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(i) the equilibrium downstream prices of both the affiliate and the rival are non-decreasing in
the level of cost-increasing sabotage; and
(ii) the equilibrium downstream prices of both the affiliate and the rival are non-increasing in
the level of demand-reducing sabotage if assumptions (A3.1) and (A3.2) hold. More
generally, the effects of increased demand-reducing sabotage on downstream prices are
ambiguous.26
Since cost-increasing sabotage induces the rival to raise its price, the resulting increase in
demand for the affiliate’s product ensures higher downstream profit for the integrated firm.
Therefore, absent upstream effects, cost-increasing sabotage always increases the profit of the
integrated firm. This conclusion is recorded formally as Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1.    When upstream effects are absent and the downstream firms engage in Bertrand
competition, the upstream producer will undertake cost-increasing sabotage.
Demand-reducing sabotage can affect the profit of the integrated firm differently than does cost-
increasing sabotage under Bertrand competition. When assumption (A3.1) holds, demand-reducing
sabotage induces the rival to lower the price it charges for its product. The reduced price for the
rival’s product reduces the demand for the affiliate’s product, which reduces the downstream profit
of the integrated firm. Therefore, absent upstream effects, demand-reducing sabotage would reduce
the profit of the integrated firm in the Bertrand setting, and so would not be undertaken, as
Proposition 3.2 reports.
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Proposition 3.2.     When upstream effects are absent, assumption (A3.1) holds, and the downstream
firms engage in Bertrand competition, the upstream producer will not undertake demand-
reducing sabotage.
The upstream effects of sabotage remain to be considered. The upstream effects of cost-
increasing sabotage can introduce a countervailing effect on the integrated firm’s profit under
Bertrand competition, as they do under Cournot competition. The price increases that cost-increasing
sabotage induce can reduce the rival’s downstream output, and thus the rival’s demand for access.
Consequently, if the direct costs of initial increments in sabotage ( and ) and the
upstream profit margin  are sufficiently large, the upstream losses from cost-increasing
sabotage can outweigh the downstream gains. When this is the case, no cost-increasing sabotage will
arise in equilibrium.
Upstream considerations can introduce additional effects of demand-reducing sabotage on
equilibrium profits. The direct upstream effects of demand-reducing sabotage reduce the profit of
the integrated firm by introducing sabotage costs ( ) and reducing the rival’s demand for access.
Therefore, these direct effects reinforce the downstream effects that underlie Proposition 3.2.
However, the indirect upstream effect of demand-reducing sabotage is a countervailing one. The
equilibrium price reductions induced by demand-reducing sabotage stimulate increased rival demand
for access, and thereby increase upstream profit. Assumptions (A3.3) and (A3.4) ensure that this
countervailing indirect upstream effect of demand-reducing sabotage under Bertrand competition
does not dominate the corresponding downstream and direct upstream effects.
Assumption (A3.3).    .
Assumption (A3.4).   (i)   for ;  (ii)    for  
and  (iii)  
27. Notice that conditions (ii) and (iii) of assumption (A3.4) hold, for example, when demand curves are
additively separable and concave in prices (i.e., when  and  for  =   and
for  = 1, 2).
28. As indicated in footnote 26 and demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3.3, assumption (A3.4) ensures
the Bertrand equilibrium is unique and stable. A relatively strong assumption like assumption (A3.4)
is required to ensure that demand-reducing sabotage will not arise in equilibrium even though the
Bertrand subgame is supermodular and has monotone marginal payoffs under assumptions (A3.1) and
(A3.2). This is because supermodularity and monotonicity of marginal payoffs do not guarantee
monotonicity of equilibrium payoffs in the presence of potentially countervailing upstream effects.
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Assumption (A3.3) ensures that demand-reducing sabotage shifts the rival’s demand curve
inward without changing its slope and without changing its sensitivity to the affiliate’s price.  When
assumption (A3.3) holds, the reduction in the rival’s price caused by demand-reducing sabotage will
be relatively limited. Condition (i) of assumption (A3.4) is the standard assumption that each firm’s
demand varies more with changes in its own price than with changes in its opponent’s price.
Condition (ii) states that equal reductions in both downstream prices (  and ) render each
competitor’s demand less sensitive to its own price, and thereby reduce the appeal of further price
reductions. Condition (iii)  states that equal reductions in both downstream prices render the rival’s
demand more sensitive to changes in the affiliate’s price.27 This increased sensitivity increases the
rate at which upstream profit declines due to reduced demand for access by the rival as the affiliate’s
downstream price declines.
Together, assumptions (A3.3) and (A3.4) ensure that initial price reductions both reduce the
potential downstream gains from further price reductions for the affiliate and the rival and render
further price reductions by the affiliate more costly in terms of reduced access demand by the rival.
Consequently, the downstream and direct upstream effects of demand-reducing sabotage outweigh
its indirect upstream effect (i.e., increased rival demand for access due to induced price reductions)
under these conditions, and so sabotage will not be profitable for the integrated firm. This conclusion
is stated formally in Proposition 3.3.28
29. Under the conditions of Proposition 3.3, demand-reducing sabotage causes a strict decline in the profit
of the integrated supplier, even if the sabotage is costless. Therefore, the integrated supplier would
refrain from demand-reducing sabotage even if (as Reiffen (1998) suggests) the supplier experienced
some cost savings by doing so, provided the cost savings were not too pronounced. Furthermore, since
demand-reducing sabotage reduces the integrated supplier’s profit, the supplier might benefit by
undertaking actions that increase (rather than decrease) the demand for the rival’s product.
30. Demand-reducing sabotage can strictly reduce the profit of the integrated firm. Consequently, if cost-
increasing and demand-reducing sabotage are inextricably linked, the losses from demand-reducing
sabotage may outweigh the gains from cost-increasing sabotage, and so the integrated producer may
refrain from both types of sabotage. The two types of sabotage may be inextricably linked, for example,
when providing inferior quality access both imposes costs on a rival and reduces customer perception
of the rival’s reliability. We thank Dennis Weisman for pointing out this possibility.
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Proposition 3.3.   When assumptions (A3.3) and (A3.4) hold and the downstream firms engage in
Bertrand competition, the upstream firm will not undertake demand-reducing sabotage.29
In summary, Propositions 2.1 - 3.3 reveal that the incentives for sabotage vary according to both
the type of sabotage and the nature of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage tends to
raise the downstream profit of the integrated producer under both Cournot and Bertrand competition,
but may reduce upstream profit. Demand-reducing sabotage has similar effects under Cournot
competition. However, demand-reducing sabotage tends to reduce downstream profit under Bertrand
competition, and so may not arise in equilibrium.30
4. The Effects of Product Differentiation.
Sabotage can benefit the integrated producer by enabling the affiliate to capture some of the
customer demand that would otherwise accrue to the rival. The increase in demand for the affiliate’s
product that arises as the rival’s equilibrium output declines in response to sabotage generally will
vary with the degree of product differentiation in the industry. Economides (1998) and Mandy
(2000) demonstrate that strong incentives for sabotage can arise when the affiliate and rival produce
homogeneous products. The purpose of this section is to examine how incentives for sabotage vary
31. Kang and Weisman (2001) examine how incentives for cost-increasing sabotage vary with the cross-
price elasticity of demand under Bertrand competition.
32. Demand-reducing sabotage must be parameterized differently in the linear setting under downstream
Bertrand competition. When  and , the intercepts of both the rival’s and the
affiliate’s demand curve decline as  increases, even though only the intercept of the rival’s inverse
- 18 -
with the degree of product differentiation.31
To provide a convenient parameterization of product heterogeneity, we follow Vives (1984;
1999, p. 145) and assume there is a representative consumer with the following quadratic utility
function for the outputs of the affiliate  and the rival :
    for  . (4.1)
This utility function gives rise to the following linear inverse demand functions:
    for   . (4.2)
The parameter  reflects the degree of product homogeneity in this setting. When 
= , the products of the affiliate and the rival are fully differentiated in the sense that the demand
for each firm’s product is not affected by the competitor’s price or output level. When , the
products of the affiliate and rival are homogeneous, because each firm’s demand declines as its own
price rises at the same rate that its demand increases as the price of its competitor rises.
Absent demand-reducing sabotage, the affiliate and rival are assumed to face symmetric
demands, so . Each unit of demand-reducing sabotage  reduces the
intercept of the rival’s inverse demand curve by one unit (so . Each unit
of cost-increasing sabotage  increases the rival’s marginal cost by one unit. For simplicity, we
abstract from fixed costs of production (so  and from direct costs of sabotage
(so  for all .
It is apparent that assumptions (A3.3) and (A3.4) are satisfied in this setting, which we call the
linear setting.32 Consequently, from Proposition 3.3, the integrated producer will never undertake
demand curve declines as  increases. A parameterization in which only the intercept of the rival’s
demand curve declines as  increases is  =  -   and .  Assumptions
(A3.3)  and (A3.4) hold under this parameterization. 
33. The proofs of our findings regarding the linear setting with Bertrand competition are fairly lengthy and
tedious, and so are omitted. 
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demand-reducing sabotage when the affiliate and rival engage in Bertrand competition. Hence, we
focus our analysis of the linear setting on the case where the affiliate and rival engage in Cournot
competition. However, as we emphasize when concluding this section, most of the key qualitative
conclusions regarding sabotage under Cournot competition persist with regard to cost-increasing
sabotage under Bertrand competition.33
It is readily verified that the Cournot equilibrium in the linear setting is unique (Vives, 1999,
p. 158) and stable. It is also readily shown that when they are non-negative, equilibrium output
levels in the linear setting under Cournot competition are:
,   and (4.3)
, (4.4)
where  We focus on the setting of greatest interest where, in the absence of
sabotage, the affiliate and rival both supply strictly positive levels of output in equilibrium. From
(4.3) and (4.4), this will be the case for all   when the firms engage in Cournot
competition if:
.   (4.5)
Inequality (4.5) simply rules out settings in which the operating costs of the affiliate and the rival
are very different. 
Notice from (4.3) and (4.4) that cost-increasing and demand-reducing sabotage affect
equilibrium outputs symmetrically. Furthermore, since the equilibrium profit of the integrated firm
is:
34. The integrated firm’s profit is linear in sabotage (i.e., ) if  = 0.
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,    (4.6)
it is readily verified that this profit can be written exclusively as a function of aggregate sabotage,
. (Here and throughout, we denote the equilibrium value of a variable with a “*”.)
Observation 4.1 describes an important property of this function, .
Observation 4.1. The integrated firm’s profit is a strictly convex function of sabotage in the linear
setting with Cournot competition (i.e.,  for all  for all   .34
The convexity identified in Observation 4.1 arises for the following reason. When a monopolist
operates with constant marginal cost, its profit increases at an increasing rate as the intercept of the
linear inverse demand curve that it faces increases. This convexity and the fact that sabotage
increases the intercept of the affiliate’s equilibrium inverse residual demand curve at a constant rate
in the linear setting together yield Observation 4.1. Because the integrated firm’s profit is convex
in sabotage, the firm will either refrain from sabotage or undertake the foreclosure level of sabotage,
, which is the level of sabotage that drives the rival’s equilibrium output to zero.
As noted above, Economides (1998) and Mandy (2000) have shown that the integrated firm will
undertake the foreclosure level of sabotage in the linear setting when products are homogeneous and
the affiliate’s operating cost does not exceed the rival’s operating cost. When products are
homogeneous, the affiliate is best able to capture rival demand that is displaced by sabotage.
Consequently, as long as the affiliate is at least as efficient as the rival in serving customers, the
integrated firm will effectively transfer all of the rival’s demand to the affiliate by undertaking the
foreclosure level of sabotage. For completeness, this finding is recorded as Observation 4.2.
Observation 4.2. (Economides, 1998; Mandy, 2000). Suppose the affiliate’s downstream cost is
no larger than the rival’s downstream cost (so . Then the integrated producer will
35. A weaker sufficient condition is .
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undertake the foreclosure level of sabotage when products are homogeneous in the linear setting
with Cournot competition (i.e.,  when .
In contrast, the integrated firm will have no incentive to reduce the rival’s output when products
are fully differentiated (i.e., when  . In this case, reduced rival output does not increase
demand for the affiliate’s product. Consequently, sabotage only serves to reduce upstream demand
for the input, and thereby reduces the profit of the integrated firm whenever its upstream margin
is positive. This conclusion is stated as Observation 4.3.
Observation 4.3. Suppose that sales of the input are profitable (so . Then the integrated
producer will refrain from sabotage when products are fully differentiated in the linear setting
with Cournot competition (i.e., when  ). 
Observations 4.2 and 4.3 reveal that the incentive for sabotage is generally absent when
products are fully differentiated, but can be particularly strong when products are homogeneous. It
remains to determine whether the incentive for sabotage increases systematically as products
become more homogeneous (i.e., as  increases toward ). Observation 4.4 reports that this is the
case when the affiliate is at least as efficient as the rival.35
Observation 4.4.  Suppose the upstream profit margin is strictly positive and the affiliate’s
downstream cost is no larger than the rival’s downstream cost. Then the integrated producer
will refrain from sabotage when products are sufficiently differentiated and undertake the
foreclosure level of sabotage when products are sufficiently homogeneous in the linear setting
with Cournot competition. (Formally, if and , then  there exists 
36. If , the integrated firm is indifferent among all levels of sabotage when  , and strictly
prefers the foreclosure level of sabotage to any smaller level when  . This is the case because
sabotage increases downstream profit when   and does not reduce upstream profit when
 (see equations (A4.14) and (A4.19) in the Appendix).
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such that  if   and  if  .)36
In contrast, when the rival has lower operating costs than the affiliate, incentives for sabotage
do not necessarily increase monotonically with the degree of product homogeneity, as Observation
4.5 reports.
Observation 4.5.   Suppose the upstream margin for the integrated firm is relatively large (i.e.,
 and the rival’s operating cost is small relative to the affiliate’s
operating cost (i.e., ). Then the integrated firm may
undertake more sabotage as products become less homogeneous (i.e.,  may increase from 
to  as  declines over some ranges).
The non-monotonic relationship between sabotage and product homogeneity identified in
Observation 4.5 can arise because of the following two considerations. First, recall that when the
rival has lower operating costs than the affiliate, the integrated firm may prefer to refrain from
sabotage even when products are homogeneous (Mandy, 2000). Although sabotage would secure
greater downstream profit for the affiliate, it would sacrifice too much upstream profit by reducing
the rival’s relatively large demand for the input. Thus, when the upstream margin is of intermediate
magnitude, the integrated firm can have a slight preference to refrain from sabotage when products
are homogeneous.
Second, the rival’s output can fall as the products become less homogeneous. It will do so if the
increase in the affiliate’s output caused by increased product differentiation is large enough to shift
the rival’s equilibrium inverse residual demand curve to the left.
Now consider an integrated firm that has an upstream margin of intermediate magnitude (and
37. Indeed, it can be shown that when the affiliate and rival always produce absent sabotage, the amount
of cost-increasing sabotage that the integrated producer undertakes is non-decreasing in the degree of
product homogeneity in the linear setting with Bertrand competition.
38. The foreclosure level of cost-increasing sabotage under Bertrand competition is the level that inflates
the rival’s marginal cost to the point where any price for the rival’s product that exceeds this marginal
cost places no effective constraints on the affiliate.   
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so has a slight preference to refrain from sabotage when products are homogeneous) and that faces
a rival whose residual inverse demand decreases as products become slightly differentiated. A small
increase in product differentiation causes upstream profit to decrease (because the rival’s demand
for the input declines) and downstream profit to increase (because the affiliate’s output rises). The
reduction in input demand reduces upstream profit considerably when the upstream margin is of
intermediate magnitude. In contrast, the increased output of the affiliate does not increase
downstream profit substantially when the affiliate’s downstream margin is relatively small. Thus,
the net effect of an increase in product differentiation is to reduce the profit of the integrated firm.
Because the integrated firm has only a mild preference to refrain from sabotage when products are
homogeneous, the integrated firm can switch to preferring sabotage as products become slightly
differentiated.
A corresponding non-monotonicity of cost-increasing sabotage does not arise in the linear
setting with downstream Bertrand competition.37 However, the qualitative conclusions reported in
Observations 4.1 - 4.4  hold in this setting. In particular, the integrated firm will either refrain from
sabotage or undertake the foreclosure level of cost-increasing sabotage.38 It will refrain from cost-
increasing sabotage if products are sufficiently differentiated (i.e., if  ) and the
upstream profit margin is positive (i.e., . The integrated firm will undertake the foreclosure
level of cost-increasing sabotage when products are sufficiently homogeneous (i.e., when  ),
the upstream margin is positive ( ), and the affiliate’s operating costs are no higher than the
rival’s (so ).
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5.    Summary and Conclusions.
The existing literature offers two important insights regarding the incentives that a vertically
integrated supplier may have to sabotage its downstream rivals. First, cost-increasing sabotage
generally confers an advantage upon the affiliated downstream producer, and thereby increases its
profit. Second, by reducing downstream output, sabotage can reduce demand for the upstream
product, thereby reducing upstream profit. Thus, the literature suggests that the downstream benefits
of cost-increasing sabotage must be weighed against the corresponding upstream costs to determine
whether sabotage will occur in practice.
The present research has confirmed these two observations about cost-increasing sabotage in
a variety of settings. It has also demonstrated that the gains from cost-increasing sabotage can be
particularly pronounced when competitors’ products are homogeneous, although greater product
homogeneity need not increase incentives for sabotage systematically. In addition, this research has
provided two observations about demand-reducing sabotage. First, the basic tradeoff between
downstream gains and upstream losses under cost-increasing sabotage generally persist under
demand-reducing sabotage in the presence of Cournot competition downstream. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, demand-reducing sabotage may  introduce no such tradeoff in the
presence of Bertrand competition downstream. Under Bertrand competition, demand-reducing
sabotage can reduce the downstream profit of the integrated supplier (by inducing rivals to react
aggressively by setting lower prices for their products, which reduces the demand for the integrated
firm’s downstream product). Furthermore, there may be no countervailing upstream gains (since the
sabotage can reduce downstream output, and thus demand for the upstream product). Therefore, in
the presence of Bertrand competition downstream, an integrated supplier may have no incentive to
engage in demand-reducing sabotage. 
This finding does not suggest that the possibility of sabotage by a vertically integrated producer
should be ignored when designing public policy toward vertical integration. It suggests instead that
39. See Weisman (1998) for additional thoughts on this issue.
40. Regulators can also reduce incentives for sabotage by increasing the costs that an integrated producer
incurs when it engages in sabotage. Regulators can devote more resources to monitoring sabotage and
impose larger penalties if sabotage is detected, for example (Kang and Weisman, 2001).
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in order to fully assess the likelihood and extent of sabotage, one should consider carefully both the
types of sabotage that might be undertaken and the nature of the relevant downstream competition.
The findings also provide some guidance regarding the types of sabotage that merit the closest
scrutiny if monitoring of sabotage is undertaken to limit its incidence. 
Although we have extended the literature by examining both demand-reducing and cost-
increasing sabotage, further extensions remain to be pursued. One extension is to analyze other types
of sabotage. For instance, as Economides (1998) suggests, some forms of sabotage might
unavoidably affect the downstream operations of the integrated producer as well as the operations
of rivals.39 It is also possible that sabotage might serve primarily to raise a rival’s cost of improving
its service quality, rather than raising its marginal cost of production or directly reducing the demand
for its product. Another extension that merits investigation is strategic pricing in conjunction with
sabotage. It is apparent that an integrated supplier might undertake price discrimination to
disadvantage downstream rivals (e.g., the supplier might charge rivals more for access than it
charges its downstream affiliate). The supplier might also fail to implement legitimate cost-based
price discrimination that would benefit rivals (Bernheim and Willig, 1996, p. 4.17). It would be
useful to determine the extent to which strategic pricing and (non-price) sabotage are complementary
or substitute activities.
The optimal design of regulatory policy in vertically-related industries also merits careful study.
Our findings, along with others in the literature, suggest that there are conditions under which a
regulator can mitigate incentives for sabotage by raising the price of the upstream product above its
marginal cost of production.40 Doing so increases the integrated firm’s opportunity cost of engaging
41. Laffont and Tirole (2000, pp. 161-166) also note that pricing access at marginal cost may create
incentives for exclusion. By adopting the proposal of the Coalition for Affordable Local and Long
Distance Service on May 31, 2000, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has decided to
move access charges rapidly toward the marginal cost of supplying access in the telecommunications
industry (FCC, 2000).
42. Hinton et al. (1988) and Mandy (2000) discuss some related effects.
43. As Beard et al. (2001) suggest, the likely benefits and costs of fostering competition among upstream
suppliers also merits careful consideration in any complete analysis of regulatory policy in vertically-
related industries.
- 26 -
in sabotage that reduces the demand for the firm’s upstream product. Thus, the standard prescription
of marginal cost pricing for access may warrant reconsideration when the potential for sabotage is
pronounced.41
Incentives for sabotage may also be affected by the legal relationship between the upstream and
the downstream units of the integrated firm. If the downstream firm is required to operate as a
separate subsidiary, it may value the upstream profit generated by its purchases of the upstream
product less highly than it otherwise would. Consequently, the downstream firm may increase the
price it charges or reduce its output, thereby altering the nature of downstream competition.42 All
of the ramifications of a separate subsidiary requirement merit investigation in a complete model
of optimal regulatory policy in industries with vertically integrated production. Such a model should
also allow the regulator to expend resources in an attempt to detect, and thereby deter, sabotage.43
It would be particularly useful to examine the design of regulatory policy in a setting where the
regulator’s knowledge of the industry is incomplete. In practice, an upstream producer often has
privileged knowledge about its likely downstream operating costs and about its incentive and ability
to sabotage the activities of its downstream rivals. The optimal manner in which to elicit this
privileged information while limiting sabotage and increasing industry welfare is an important issue
44. Vickers (1995) and Lee and Hamilton (1999) examine the optimal design of industry structure in a
setting with asymmetric information, but do not consider the possibility of sabotage.
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for future research.44
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
Let  denote either of the extremal equilibria in the Cournot subgame.
Also define . For any :
     
. (A2.1)
The inequality in (A2.1) holds because  ensures the highest value for , given
, and .
When upstream effects are absent, (2.1) and (2.2) imply:
 . (A2.2)
Substituting (A2.2) into (A2.1) provides:
 
. (A2.3)
The term in square brackets in (A2.3) is non-negative because  is non-increasing in  (by
Lemma 2.1) and  is non-increasing in (by assumption). Consequently,  
. This inequality will be strict if the downstream equilibrium is interior and unique,
because  is strictly decreasing in  in this case (by Lemma 2.1; see footnote 17).    (
Proof of Proposition 2.2.
Let . It follows from the logic developed in the proof of Proposition 2.1 that when upstream
effects are absent:
 - A2 -
. (A2.4)
The term in square brackets in (A2.4) is non-negative because  is non-increasing in  (by
Lemma 2.1, provided assumption (A2.1) holds) and  is non-increasing in  (by
assumption). Consequently, . This inequality will hold strictly if the
downstream equilibrium is interior and unique, because  is strictly decreasing in  in this case
(by Lemma 2.1; see footnote 17).   (
Proof of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2.
Let  denote either of the extremal equilibria. Define
 , (A3.1)
and consider any . Since  ensures the highest value for , given ,
and , it follows that:
      . (A3.2)
From (3.1) and (3.2),
. (A3.3)
(A3.2) and (A3.3) imply that when upstream effects are absent (i.e.,  and ),
       . (A3.4)
The first term in square brackets in (A3.4), the profit margin, is non-negative in equilibrium because
the affiliate can always set  so high as to ensure shutdown. The second term in square brackets
in (A3.4) is non-negative because  is non-decreasing in  by Lemma 3.1 and  is non-
 - A3 -
decreasing in  by assumption. Hence, . That is, a positive level of
cost-increasing sabotage is at least as profitable for the integrated firm as is no cost-increasing
sabotage. If the downstream equilibrium is interior and unique, the inequality in (A3.4) is strict
because: (i) the profit margin is strictly positive (otherwise, firm I’s first order condition cannot
hold); and (ii)  is strictly increasing in , by Lemma 3.1 (see footnote 26). Therefore, the
integrated firm will choose a strictly positive level of cost-increasing sabotage when the equilibrium
is locally interior and unique at  (absent upstream effects). This proves Proposition 3.1.
Now consider any . The optimality of , given , 0, and , implies:
 . (A3.5)
Substituting from (A3.3) into (A3.5) provides:
      
      
       . (A3.6)
(A3.6) implies that when upstream effects are absent, 
       . (A3.7)
The second term in square brackets in (A3.7) is non-positive because  is non-increasing in 
by Lemma 3.1 (when assumption (A3.1) holds) and  is non-decreasing in  by assumption.
Hence, . That is, a positive level of demand-reducing sabotage is not
strictly more profitable for the integrated firm than no sabotage. If the downstream equilibrium is
 - A4 -
interior and unique, then the inequality in (A3.7) is strict because  is strictly decreasing in 
by Lemma 3.1 (see footnote 26). So the integrated firm will choose zero demand-reducing sabotage
when the equilibrium is locally interior and unique at  (absent upstream effects, when
assumption (A3.1) holds). This proves Proposition 3.2.   (
Proof of Proposition 3.3.
From (A3.6) , the conclusion in Proposition 3.2 continues to hold when  and 
provided:
      . (A3.8)
For an infinitesimal change in  at a unique interior equilibrium, inequality (A3.8) is:
     . (A3.9)
At a unique interior solution, the equilibrium prices  are defined by:
     and   . (A3.10)
Differentiating (A3.10) with respect to  and solving for the derivative of  with respect to 
yields:
  . (A3.11)
It follows from (3.1) - (3.3) that, at the equilibrium:
 , (A3.12)
 , (A3.13)
 , (A3.14)
 , (A3.15)
 , and (A3.16)
 - A5 -
 . (A3.17)
Substituting equations (A3.12) - (A3.17) into (A3.11) and using assumption (A3.3) provides:
  . (A3.18)
It follows from (A3.12), (A3.13), (A3.15), and (A3.16) that:
      ;   and (A3.19)
                                                         . (A3.20)
The inequalities in (A3.19) and (A3.20) follow from assumption (A3.4) and the fact that profit
margins are positive at an interior equilibrium. Inequalities (A3.19) and (A3.20) and the assumption
of strategic complementarity imply:
  for  . (A3.21)
(A3.21) implies that the denominator of expression (A3.18) is positive, indicating that assumption
(A3.4) is sufficient for stability of the equilibrium. 
Substituting equations (A3.12) - (A3.18) into (A3.9) provides:
     (A3.22)
(A3.23)
(A3.24)
(A3.25)
 - A6 -
(A3.26)
 . (A3.27)
(A3.23) holds because the denominator in (A3.22) is positive and . (A3.25) and (A3.26)
follow from (A3.21). The inequality in (A3.27) follows from assumption (A3.4) and the fact that the
rival’s profit margin is positive at an interior equilibrium.   (
Proof of Observations 4.1 and 4.3.
Substituting from (4.2) - (4.4) into (4.6) provides:
     + . (A4.1)
Differentiating (A4.1) with respect to  provides:
  and (A4.2)
. (A4.3)
Observation 4.1 follows from (A4.3), and Observation 4.3 follows from (A4.2) since (A4.2) is
negative under the stated conditions.   (
Proof of Observation 4.2.
From (A4.2) with  :
 . (A4.4)
From (4.3) with     if and only if:
 ,   or
 - A7 -
 . (A4.5)
Substituting (A4.5) into (A4.4) yields:
 . (A4.6)
Thus,  > 0  when  and  is below the level that forecloses firm  (i.e.,  so
that  and (A4.5) holds as a strict inequality).  Since  is strictly increasing for 
it follows that .     (
Proof of Observation 4.4.
Let .  The foreclosure level of sabotage  is defined by . Therefore,
from (4.3):
 . (A4.7)
When the integrated producer undertakes the foreclosure level of sabotage, its profit is:
 .  (A4.8)
Substitution from (4.2), (4.4), and (A4.7) into (A4.8) provides:
.   (A4.9)
It follows from (4.2) - (4.4), (4.6), and (A4.9) that:
  
   , (A4.10)
where, from (4.3):
. (A4.11)
 - A8 -
Let   and . Therefore,
because 
, the first of the two terms in (A4.10) can be written as:
. (A4.12)
Substituting (A4.11) and (A4.12) into (A4.10) and simplifying provides:
,   where ,   and (A4.13)
.(A4.14)
Hence  for   If  > 0, then ; while if , then 
 
Notice that . Therefore,  when  (as stated in
Observation 4.3). Furthermore, since   if and only if  = 1:
 . (A4.15)
The inequality in (A4.15) holds because   From (A4.5) with :
   (A4.16)
Substituting (A4.16) into (A4.15) yields  so  when  (as Observation 4.2
implies).  Moreover, differentiation of (A4.14) provides:
 (A4.17)
(A4.18)
 - A9 -
(A4.19)
(A4.20)
Inequality (A4.19) holds because  so  Inequality (A4.20) holds because
  and   Therefore,  is strictly decreasing on [0,1].  Since
 and , there exists a unique  (i.e., a unique ) such that 
for  <   and   for  .     (
Proof of Observation 4.5.
Notice from (A4.14) that , , and  > 0.
Therefore, since is a cubic function of  and since , it
follows from (A4.14) and (A4.17) that the non-monotonicity cited in Observation 4.5 will occur if
and only if the largest root of  is strictly less than unity. It can be verified that the largest root
of is strictly less than unity when, for example,  = 10,  = 0,  = 9,  , and 
= 0.2525. These parameter values ensure that is positive but close to zero at  (i.e., at 
) and declines below zero as  is reduced below unity. As noted in the text, these parameter
values ensure that  declines as  declines below unity.       (
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